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1CT 11 1961 
PREFACE 
The years from 1905 to 1920 witne~~ed t~e appearance of 4 new 
Negro lea~ership in the United States in opposition to the pfevailing 
race phil9sophy. This paper is concerijed with tpe attempts made by 
~."l •• • 
the new 111!gro leadership to associate H$ program with what it believed 
to be the idealistic nature of both thf Woodrow .Wilson administra~ion 
and the World War. The period under cq,sideration begins with the 
election of 1912 and ends with the mil~tary participation of the 
Negro race in the War late in 1917. 
The program of the new leadership ~~s been drawn largely from the 
editorial comment of a selective and w~at is hoped a representative 
number of Negro publications. 
The auttj.or wishes to.express his ~l)preciation and indebtedness 
to Drs. O.' A. Hilton, Theodore L. Agnew ~nd Leltoy H. Fisch,r for their 
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INTRODUCTION 
The freedmen, the vast majority of the Negroes in the post-Civil 
War United States (1865-1890), generally lacked the economic and edu-
cational basis to give their newly won political liberty independent 
direction. As a result, they passed from the paternalistic and usually 
exploitative carpetbag regimes to a similar situation under the Redeemer 
governments. But by being allied with the conservative controlling 
segment of the southern Democratic Party against the more anti-Negro 
lower economic and social element of the Party, the southern colored 
citizens, prior to 1890, experienced little widespread legislative segre-
gation and, alfhough for the most part under tb.e direction and dominance 
of their "allies," remained politically alive. 
Northern race leaders of the abolitionist tradition, such as 
Frederick Do~gla~s, after. 1877, (ioatinued to demand aggressive politi-
cal activity by the colored citizenry. However, with the disappearing 
zeal of the North for the Negroes' plight and the decline of the Re-
publican Party in the South, the Douglass appeal had little effect. 
Others, such as T. Thomas Fortune, a leading Negro journalist, during 
the 1880's advocated independent political action by the black race as 
a means of bargaining for increased economic and political opportunities. 
The hope of wielding the political balance of power in the South seemed 
to be within the grasp of the Negroes with the emergence of the Farmer's 
Alliance movement and the resulting split in the Democratic Party. The 
1 
2 
insurgent Democrats, joined by many southern Republicans, appealed 
for the colored vote by denouncing lynchings and promising the Negroes 
full political rights. But out of this promising situation for the 
colored race developed a general .movement in ,the: South in the 1890's, 
sanctioned by court 4ecisions, which by 1910 had almost completely dis-
l\ 
franchise"d the black citizens and had introdu.ced widespread "Jim Crowism." 
The Negro in countering the new aggressive racist attacks had little 
chance of aid from the national Republican Party which as early as the 
1880's had endo~sed the white supremacy movement in the South. In ad-
dition the climate of the Spanish-American War provided added impetus 
to the idea of Caucausian supremacy. After 1900, race riots and anti• 
Negro literature furthered·the racist thinking and increased the diffi-
culties for ·the black race. 
During the critical period from 1890 to 1910 Booker T. Washington, 
the principal national leader of the colored race, did not consciously 
I 
encourage o~ sanction the innovations, but his program for the race 
generally proved to be compatible with the results if not the spirit 
behind the anti-Negro legislation. The Tuskegee President's basic goal 
was to win white support and philanthropy for Negro education • .He rele-
gated political activity to the future and accepted social separation. 
However, he continually fought for equality o.f "Jim Crow" accommodations 
.and attended the various disfranchising conventions, where he endorsed 
the principle of limited suffrage but urged application of the limits-
tions without regard to race. 
The Tuskegee phil~~ophy, reacting against the dbappointments of 
political activities during Reconstruction and b.ased on a realistic 
appraisal of the Negroes' economic needs, rested on the belief 
3 
that self-improvement, primarily through economic progress and a con-
ciliatory attitude, would bring inevitable progress in the political 
and social spheres. This was pragmatic and realistic, but it required 
at least the good will if not the cooperation of the whites. It was 
more compatible with the old southern paternalistic 'attitude than the 
late nineteenth century a~gressive ex~essions of racism. 
Partly due to the belief.that the Tuskegae method contributed to 
or was not adequate to cope with the new problems, and because of the 
general reform spirit of the time, Washington's ideas and leadership 
were increasingly challenged after 1902. The first significant Negro 
figure to offer resistance to$ and the man that became the leading 
dissenter from the Washington school of thought was a Massachusetts-
born Atlanta University professor of sociology, W.E.B. DuBois. In 1903, 
DuBois projected in his book, Souls !f Black Folk, a belief that 
Washington's work, although necessary and valuable, was not sufficient, 
and the 'time had come for Negroes to demand full and equal rights of 
citizenship. The same year another important VQice of dissent appeared 
in the person of William Monroe Trotter, a Harvard~educated lawyer who 
was founder and co~editor of the Boston Guardian, a Negro weekly. 
Trotter burst upon t~e national scene when he and his followers turned 
a Boston meeting which was being addressed by Washington, into a general 
riot. This action resulted in a thirty days jail sentence for Trotter 
and unanimous denunciation from the colored press for his unheard-of 
''irreverent0 treatment of Washington. 
In an attempt to unify the small group of "j..ndepend-entslf or "radi-
cals, ,,l DuBois issued a call for a secret convention of interested persons 
1The terms "radicals'' and "independents" will be used to denote those 
4 
to meet near Niagara Falls in July, 1905. Out of this meeting of 
twenty-nine persons representing thir~een states, emerged the Niagara 
movement. They issued a manifesto that among other things demanded 
full suffrage for the Negroes, an end to ''Jim Crowism,J' and. the right 
of free association. However,, _the Niagara movement after reaching a 
high point of two hundred and thirty-six members in April, 1907, col-
lapsed due to the lack of financial resources and to the active oppo-
sition of Washi111gton. Also, the uncompromising character of both DuBois 
and Trotter caused internal dissension which resulted in the latter 
leaving the organization. 
More dissatisfaction with the Tuskegee leadersh·ip appeared in 1906 
as a. result of major race riots in Atlanta and Brownsville. Alexander 
Walters, Bishop of the African Methodist Ep1scopal Church and president 
of the Afro-American Council, broke with the Republican Party due to the 
handling of the B,;ownsville riot and organized the.National Colored 
Democratic League. The Bishop in 1905 had unfucceufully sought Washing• 
ton's approval for his plan to convert the loosely organized and virtually 
inactive Council, the largest Negro organization in the United States, 
into a liberal weapon-against the radicals. The Bishop's decision in 
1907 to support the Democratic ticket placed him in opposition to Washing-
ton., who had established close relations with the national R.epublican 
Par~y prior to 1900. 
The dissatisfaction with the Republican Party as a result of 
Roesevett·.,·s·····'ba1'ili1i:ng··o·f·1:n.e···"Brown-sv·Ut·e··a:ffa:Lr aint ··the exclusion of 
Negroes who were opposed to Booker T. Washington's methods, especially 
his de-emphasis of political activity, and his accomodatio~ atti,tude. 
5 
Negroes from the southern convention delegations, provided a rallying 
point for the radicals in 1908. Trotter, ,£.ter his break with the 
Niagara organization, organized the National Equal Rights League in 
April, 1908. The main purpose of the League was to help prevent the 
nomination and election of William Howard Taft. DuBois by 1908 ha~ 
develo~ed his scheme of trying, though without success, to persuade the 
Democrats te repudiate the sou.;hern racial policies in return for the 
northern Negro vote, which he believed, if mobilized, could deliver New 
Jersey~ New York, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois to the Democratic banner. 
During the campaign, he first advocated a boycott by the colored voters 
and then announced his support of William J. Bryan, although with little 
enthusiasm. The individualistic efforts of DuBois, Trotter and Walters 
on behalf of the Democrats had little success in attracting Negro support, 
due to the predominant Washingtonian influence, but it posed a potential-
ly serious challenge to the traditional Republican Negro vote. 
Late in 1908~ as a result of a lynching in Springfield, Illinois, 
and the spreading racist actions outside the South, a group of northern 
reformers led by Oswald G. Villard, publisher of the Nation magazine and 
the !!!, !2!!, Evening Post and the grandson of William Lloyd Garrisen, 
launched a movement that in the following year culminated in the inter-
racial National Association fer the Advancement of Colored People. 
The Association was at first do1dnated by white citizens, including 
J,ne Addams, John Deweyi, William Dean Howells, Lincoln Steffens, Moorfield 
Storey, Mary White Ovington and Joel Spingarn. Only five Negroes attended 
the founding conference in F~bruary, 1909, and DuBois was the only Negro 
officer selected when th:e .new 111oventent was formally organized in May, 1910. 
He was named Director of Publications and was given complete editorial 
freedom in his supervision of the Crisis:> the monthly organ of the N.A.A.C.P. 
6 
Alexander Walters, the Reverend J • .Milton Waldron, the·,~reasurer of 
the defunct Niagara association, and John B. Milholland, president of 
the Constitutional League, a national in,terracial lobbying organization 
for N,gro rights, were the other significant colored charter members. 
Trotter declined to join because of his early aonflicts with DuBois. 
Furthermore, he believed the tone of the movement was too conserva·tive. 
Thu11 in 1910, as the Negro disfranchisement arid "Jim Crow" legisla-
tion was near completion in the South, the passive political and social 
philosophy of Washington was being challenged by a group of northern Negro 
and interracial organizations, supported by a segment of the northern 
independent white press and several Ne.gro publications, including the 
Crisis, the Cleveland Gazette, the Baltimore llig_-American and the Boston 
. ' -
Guardian, devoted to agitation, legal action and indep•ndent political 
2 
pressure on behalf of immediate equal citizenship rights for the Negro. 
2Additional introductory information can be found in the following. 
Basil Math•:ws, Booker I· Washington: Educator.!!!!, Interracial Inter-
preter (Cambridge: Harvard Universi.~y Press, 1948); Elliott M. B.udwick, 
''The Niagara Movement," Journal 21 Negro Hhtory (July, 1957), XLII, 177-
200; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of .sh!, New''South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 75-107, 142-175, 321-396; Charles 
W. Puttkammer and Ruth Worthy, ''William Monroe Trotter, 1872-1934," 
Journal!! Negro History (October, 1958), VLIII, 298, 317; Ema Lou 
Thornbrough~ "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review (December, 1957), XLIV~ 469-494. 
CHAPTER l 
THE RABICALS Alil> WILSON 
The small group of Negro radicals and their white allies felt by 
1912 that they had sufficient following and influence to extract con-
cessions from one of the major parties. Having already rejected the 
Republicans» many of the radicals first chose the .Progressive Party. 
However, the Progressive leadership refused to recognize the southern 
Negro convention delegations, and the platform committee rejected a civil 
l 
rights plank drafted by DuBois and presented by Joel Spingarn. As a 
result~ the independent Negroes and their white supporters were obliged 
to obtain the best they could from Woodrow Wilson, despite their fears 
of the Democratic Party and the concern over Wilson's southern birth. 
Rumors that he had drawn the color line at Princeton and as Governor of 
2 
New Jersey increased the anxiety of many of the le~ders, 
Seeking some assurances, a committee from the Independent Equal 
Rights League headed by the Rev,rend Milton Waldron and William Monroe 
3 Trotter approached Wilson as early as July 16, 1912," They apparently 
received only the vague response that if elected pe would "seek to be 
President of the whole nation and would know no differences of race or 
lFrancis L .• Broderick, !•!•!• DuBois g Negro Leader !!, !. !!!!!, 2.f 
Crisis (Stanford, California: Stanford University Presss 1959), 96. 
2Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The~!£.£!!!, Whit! House (Princeton, 




creed or section, but to act in good conscience and in a Christian spirit 
"4 
However, Waldron made public alleged re!lU!rks by Wilson that he in-
vited Negro suppart and would veto any an.ti-Negro l_egislation, passed by 
Congress.' Upon learning of the action by Waldron, Wilson wrote to Oswald 
Villard denying that he had promised to veto any legislation or had said 
be was in need of Negro votes. In an attempt to clarify his views and to 
satisfy the deDU1nds upon him, "Wilson urged Villard to prepare a statement 
that he could issue as his official position on the Negro question. But 
when !illard presented him with a draft pr~pared by DuBois it was re-
jected. Wilson was not willing to endorse the position that the Democratic 
Party sought or welcomed Negro support or that he personally was opposed 
to racial disfranchisement. 5 Throughout the remaining summer months of 
1912, Villard and others continued to seek some statement on the Negro 
problem that would include definite proposals, but failed to receive a 
satisfactory response. 
In October, Bishop Alexander Walters invited Wilson to address a 
mass meeting in New York City of the National Colored Democratic League. 
Walters had supported the Democratic Ticket since 1907 and was almost a 
party regular in comparison to the more independently oriented N.A.A.C.P., 
DuBois, and Trotter. Wilson declined the invitation but on Oc;tober 16 
sent a letter to the Bishop for public release. 
I hope that it seems superfluous to those who know me, but 
to those who do not know me perhaps it is not unnecessary 
tor me to assure my coloured fellow citizens of my earnest 
4Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Li£• ru, Letters (8 vols., 
New York: Doubleday,}>oran and Company, 1927-1938), III,, 387. 
5 Link, !2!!, U .the Wh~te House» 504. 
wish to see justice done th,111 in every Dl8tter, and not mere 
) grudging justice, but justi~e executed with liberality and 
cordial good.- fe•ling. Every guarantee of our· law, every 
principle of ou~ Constitutipn commands this and our sympathies 
should also makf it easy • :. • • My sympathy for them is of 
long standing, and I want to assure them through you that 
should I become President of the United States they may count 
upon me for absolute fair dealing and f,r everything by _which 
I could assist !i,n advancing the interests of their race in 
the United Stat•s.6 
I 
This became Wilson's official stand on the Negro question. 
Despite the lack of specifies in these statements, Trotter and 
Walters and their re~pective organizations, the National Colored Demo-
cratic League and the National Independent Political League, gave Wilson 
their enthusiastic s~pport. With less enthusiasm and more misgivings, 
' ' 
DuBois and the leaders of the N.A.A.C.11'. endorsed the Democratic candi-. . ~ . 
. ,- 7 
date late in the campaign. It is extremely unlikely that the efforts 
of the radicals on behalf of Wilson had any effect on the outcome of the 
·election. Nevet:theless, they confidently welcomed the inauguration and 
'! 
were sure that their.efforts had not been in vain. 
Any hopes held by the radicals of a ''second emancipation'' under 
Wilson were quickly dispelled as reports from the capital in -the late 
spring of 1913 indic~ted that widespread segregation was being insti-
gated in the Poi·t Office and Treasury :Departments. The ~dministratiotl 's 
decision to introduce segregation was made as early as April 11, 1~13. 
At that time during a cabinet meeting Postmaster ~eneral Burleson com-
. plained of fr_iction petween white and Negro railway mail clerks and 
' . 1-......; • . . 
sugge,s'ted separation as the re1eedy 1 not just for his department b~t for 
all departmeat.s.... Ra., c.laimaac .. to. hav.~. ciiseuss.:ed the matter with ~ishop 
6isaker, ,L!t!. and Letters, III, 387-388~ 
7Broderick, DuBois, 96. 
9 
10 
Walters and other colored citizens .and to have received the apprc;,val of 
most of them. The President gave his consent to the prepared changes and 
stated that he had"· •• made no promises in particulars to the Negroes, 
except to do them justice 
When the segregation adjustments became apparent, the N.A.A.C.P. 
and Villard forwarded protests and inquiries to Wilson demanding some 
explanation. On July 23, in a letter to Villard, Wilson explained that 
it was 
••• true that the segregation of the colored employees in 
the several departm~~ts was begun upon the initiative and at 
the suggestion of several of the heads of departments, but 
as much in the intere~t of the Negroes as for any other reasons 
with the approval of, ,,_s~me pf the most influential Negroes • • 
•» and with the; .idea th.at the friction or rather the discon-
tent a~d uneasiness, which had prevailed in many of the depart-
ments would thereby be removed. 
The President then justified the action as being in the best interest of 
the race. 
It is as far as possible from being a movement against the 
Negroes. I sincerely believe it to be in their interest. 
4 0 • 0 4-
I am sorry that those who interest themselves most in the 
welfare of th~ Negroes should misjudge t1iis action on the 
part of the departments .••• My own feeling is, by putting 
certain bureaus and sections in the charge of Negroes we are 
rendering them more safe in their possession of office and 
less likely to be discriminated against.9 
As protests from the northern press•nd Churc;h orgauizations wer, 
added to those of the Negroes, Wilson on September 8, in a letter to 
H.A. JSridgman 9 editor of the Congregationalist and Christian World, made 
his views on the segregation policies public. 
8Arthur S. Link, Wilson: I!!!, !!!!, Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 246-247. 
9Baker, Life !!!,g; Letters, IV~ 22'1. 
••• I do not approve of the segregation. that i~ being 
attempted in several of the departments • 
• • • • but I think if you were here on t)e ground you 
would see, as I seelll to see, that it is distinctly to 
the advantage of the colored people themselves that they 
should be organized, so far as possible and convenient, 
in distinct bureaux where they will center their work. 
Some of the most thoughtful colored men I have convers,d 
with have. • .approved of th.is policy. I certainly would 
not myself have approved of it if I had not thought it to 
be their advantage and likely to remove many of the diffi-
culties which have surrounded the appointment and advance-
ment of colored men and women.10 
11 
Later in September~ in a letter to Villard 9 Wilson offered a more ap~lo-
getic explanation. 
What I would do if I could act alone you already know, but 
what I am trying to do must be done 9 if done at all~ through 
the cooperation of those with whom I am associated with in 
the Government • 
• • I believe that by the slow pressure of argument and 
persuasion the situation may be changed •••• But it can~ot 
be done ••• if a bitter agitation is inaugurated •••• 11 
Amidst the conflicting reports and rumors, the N.A.A.C •. P. had con-
ducted an investigation of conditions in the federal departments, as 
part of their nation-wide protest campaign. On November 17, .the Associ-
ation released its findings to thf;! news services 9 five hundred newspapers, 
fifty religious publications and many magazine editors. Also the report 
was circulated to the members of Congress. It declared that segregation 
had been carried out in the Miscellaneous and Examining Divis'ion of the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the Dead Letter Office of the Post 
Office Department, and the aqditor's office of the Post Office. 
In addition~ the release claimed that plans were under way 
lOlbid., 223. 
lltbid. 
to pla.c, the two hundred and seventy colored employees i.n the Treasury 
12 building into an all-Negro Registry.Divhion. The proposed all Negro 
Registry Division was originated by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo. 
He justified it on the grounds, that such a mc,ve would allow the Negroes 
to pro•e their independent merit.13 
12 
The nation-wide protests possibly had some effect on preventing any 
further extension of segregation after December of 1913. However, by 
that time .most of the colored employees had been separated, and the 
abandonment of plans for the Registry was in part due to the failure to 
gain Senate confirmation of a Negri) Register. 
An anti-climax to the segregation controversy took place late in 
1914. William M. Tr.otter, at the lead of a delegation of the National 
Independent Equal Rights League, met with Wilson on November 12, 1914. 
A Trotter committee once before, on January 6, 1914, had presented the 
14 President with an anti-segregation petition with 20,00.0 signatures. 
The November interview scheduled for fifteen minutes lasted 'ah1ost an 
hour as Trotter and Wilson became engaged in heated discussion that re-
sulted in the President rebuking Trotter for his aggressive attitude and 
dismissing the delegation. Wilson declared any further discussions 
betwe.en himself and the Negro. race would have to be with a different 
leader. During the interview the President stated that the segregation 
(• r 
affair was a human and not a political question. He labeled Trotter's 
12crisis, {December, 1913), VII» . 88. 
l3KeAdoo to Villard {October 27, 1913), Kathleen I.oag Wolgemuth, 
''Woodrow Wilson's Appointment Policy and the Negro," Journal .!!! Southern 
,History, {1:fovembe:r, 1958), XXIV, 463. 
' ' 
14crisis, (February, 1914), Vll, 17; {Jan\lary, 1915), IX, 119. 
threat:;, that he would lose the Negro votes, blackmail and a matter of 
indifference to pim. Wilson informed the delegation that the cabinet 
members had investigated the aituation and had reported that, 
••• the segregation was caused by friction between colored 
and white clerks and not done to injure or humiliate the 
colored clefks';, but to avoid friction • • • • LThex.7 had 
assured him that the colored clerks would have comfortable 
conditions» though segregated. He had taken their view that 
the segregation was the best way to meet this situation •• 
The President then elaborated on the Negro problem in general. 
I~ will take one hundred years to eradicate this prejudice, 
and we must deal with it as practical men. Segregation is 
not humiliating but a benefit» and ought to be so regarded 
by you gentlemen. If your organization goes out and tells 
the colored people of the country that it is a humiliation, 
they will so regard it, but if you do not tell them so, and 
regard it rather as a benefit, they will regard it the same. 
The only harm that will come will be if you cause them to 
think it is a humiliation. 
Trotter countered with the claim that for fifty years white and colored 
13 
have worked together in peace and harmony and accused Wilson of violating 
his 1912 pledges that had given many Negroes the belief that he would 
be "a second Lincoln. 11 15 
In an attempt to rally support and keep the controversy alive, 
Trotter conducted a lecture tour in the East and Middle Westt but with 
little success. 16 He was condemned for his lack of tact and diplomacy 
by several of the colored newspapers.17 The affair did serve further 
to confirm Wilson I s position and alienate Trotter and o,ther Negroes who 
had supported him in 1912. An e~ample was the Baltimore ~-Americ~n, 
l5crisis, (January, 1915), IX» 119-120; !!!! Y,ork Times, November 
13, 1914, -5. L> 
16crisis, (February, 1915), IX, 166. 
l 7crisis, (January, 1915), IX, 122. 
14 
which had been placing all of the blame for the segregation policies on the 
southern influence, especially on Senator James K. Vardaman of Mississippi.18 
But after 'the Trotter interview the Afro-American finally gave up all b.ope, 
"Mr. Wihon has proved himself to be a traitor, to be a receiver pf goods 
d fl .,19 un er a se pretense .• , • 
Concurrent to the segregation dispute and serving as added evidence to 
the radicals that they had misplaced their support in the 1912 election,were 
the President's patronage policies in regard to the Negro. When Wilson took 
office in 1913, Negroes held over fifty federal appointive positions. Of 
these, thirty-one were positions of authority and objects of race pride. 
The most significant were the traditional Negro posts of minister to Haiti, 
register of the Treasury, and recorder of deeds for the District of Columbia. 
Others of importance were the Consul at Cognac, France; a municipal judge-
ship in the District; an assistant attorney-general; minister to Liberia and 
auditor for the Navy. The remaining positions included four postmasterships, 
six collectors of internal revenue and customs, three assistant district 
attorneys and five consulships. 20 
Wilson apparently decided to maintain the status quo in Negro office 
holders, as evidenced by remarks during a cabinet meeting, 21 stateiaents to 
• 22 · 
Senator James Kimble Vardaman ~f Mississippi, and the fact that Trotter . . . 
and Walters prepared a list of prospective appointees but suggested ~o new 
posts. After the inauguration, Trotter and Walters became uneasy as the 
18naltimore, A!!:2.-American, December 27, 1913, January 3, 24, 1914; 
February 14, 1914; editorials. .\ 
19!!.!g,., November 14, 1914, editorial. 
20wolgemuth, ''Wilson's Appointmen~ Policy and the Negro," 458-467. 
21Link, New Freedom, 247. 
22A.S. Coody I liograehical Sketches of James Kimble Vardaman (Jack-
son, Missi~sippi: .A~S. Coody, publisher, 'i922), 57-59. 
15 
President delayed acting on their recommendations,and the uneasiness in-
creased when he dismissed the auditor of the Navy and the assistant 
attorney general and replaced them with whites.23 
;_-;:;;, 
After James C. Napier resigned as register of the Treasury in pro-
test against the segregation policies, Wilson appointed as his successor 
A. E. Patterson~ a Negro lawyer from Oklahoma who had been an active 
supporter of Wilson in 1912. However$ Patterson withdrew in the face of 
Senatorial protest led by Vardaman of Mississippi, who had declared his 
opposition to all Negro patronage except for the post of minister to 
Liberia. 24 The fact that Napier's eventual replacement was an Indian 
seemed added insult to the colored race. But .it was Patterson, not 
Wilson, who received the wrath of the Negro press.25 
The first major pretest came in August, 1913, when Wilson broke 
precedent and ignored the wishes of the Haitians by appointing a white 
mini~ter toH.aiti to replace H .. W. Furness, an lndiana\Negro, who had 
served under Roosevelt and Taft.26 The following year the new minister 
resigned but was succeeded by another white man. 27 
Those who thought southern opposition motivated the President's 
seemingly anti-Negro patronage actions had temporarily to reappraise 
the chief executive in February of 1914, when he renominated Robert B. 
Terrell as a District of Columbia Municipal Judge. Despi~e heated 
Southern opposition led by Senators Vardaman and John Sharp Williams of 
Mississippi, Wilson and John w. Kern of Indiana» the administration's 
23George-c. Osborn, ''Woodrow Wilson appoints a Negro Judge, 11 Journal 
Southern History, (Novemberp 1958)v XXII, 484. 
24wolgemuth, ''Wilson's Appointment Policy and the Negro," 461. 
25Ne.w,York Times, August 14, 1913, 8. 
26wolgemuth, "Wilson's Appointment Policy and the Negro, 11 464~ 
27Crisis, (July, 1914), Vlll 9 ll5. 
16 
floor leader, firmly pushed for Senate confirmation. 28 In a letter to 
· John Sharp Williams, the President sought to placate the opposition to 
Terrell's appointment. Be praised the nominee's qualifications, cited 
his own campaign promises and stated in view of the circumstances his 
I 
acti0'1 was regrettable but unavoidable. Wilson informed Williams he felt 
obligate~ to maintain the status quo in Negraeheld positions in the 
District. 29 
Although his action was praised by the colored press, apparently 
Wilson'e experiences with the Terrell affair convinced him that any further 
Negro appointments would be unwise.' It. is also pqssible that he pushed 
for the Terrell confirmatJon only because of an intensive pressure campaign 
on be~alf of th~ judge. The President and At<"torney-General James c. 
McReynolds were subjected to a letter and petition barrage in Terrell's 
30 
behalf several months before the· judge I s term expired. In any event, 
Wilson explained to Bishop Walters in 1916 that he would not appoint a 
Negro as recorde1r of deeds for fear of precipitating a racist debate in 
the Senate which, according to Wilson, would be harmful to the Negro.31 
During Wilson's first administratien the Negroes lost all but eight 
of the fifty plus federal appointive positions that they had held under 
Taft. Of these, seve~ were foreign. They retained the consulships of 
St. Thomas, St~ Etienne, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and Cap Haitian. 
However, George H. Jackson, a Taft appointee as consul at Cognac, was 
281altimore !!£2-A~erican, February 28, 1914, l;. May 2, 1914, 1. 
29 . Baker, ill!. and Letters, XV, 228 • 
. 30oebo:rn, 11We>odrow Wilson Appoints a Negro Judge, 11 482-484. 
31Ctis1s, (March, 1916), XI, .215. 
17 
replaced by a white in 1913. T}leCognac position wal/1 regarded as the 
best ever held by a Negro in the consular service. Besides the five 
consulships the post of legation secretary in Liberia remained in the 
possession of Negroes. The only new position obtained under Wilson was 
a deputy corporation inspectorship at Boston. 32 This was one of the five 
Negro appointments made by Wilson. The other f.our were Patterson, Terrell 
and two ~inisters to_Liberia.33 
As a result of Wilson's segregation and patronage policies with re-
gard to the colored race~ the hopes possessed by the radicals in 1912 had 
been shattered completely by the end of 1915. The credit or blame for 
the kesident 0 s racial policies probably belongs to the southern members 
of his party in CongresE3. Wilson as early as August, 1912, had showp. his 
reluctance to oppose the southern legislators, when he refused to appointi 
at the suggestien of Villard~·a commission to study ra«ze relations. 34 To 
have opposed the SCi>uthern democrats on the racial issµe could possibly 
have endangered parts of his program Wilson considered more important. 
32crisis, (February, 1914), Vilt 170. 
$3,,lbid., (November, 1913) » VJI, 326. 
34tink, !!!!_ Freedom, 244-245; Baker, Y4! ~ Let tt;rs t IV, 42 2. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RADICALS AND THE NEW SOUTH 
'-
Although the attention of the radicals from 19t3 to 1916 was prima-
rily devoted to President Wilson's policies, the most abusive attacks on 
the black Americans during those years originated on the floors of 
Congress, And as disillusionment with the President increased, the 
influence of the southern white supremacists in the legislative branch 
became, for the radicals, the obvious explanation for Wilson's attitude 
1 toward the Negro. 
With their party in control of Congress and the Presidency for the 
first since the new aggressively anti-Negro sentiment had become wide-
spread, the southern extremists in 1913 began to intensify their efforts 
to bring about nationwide adoption of their state racial policies. On 
the day the Sixty-third Congress convened (April 7, 1913), Representative 
r,ank Clark introduced two bills, one prohibiting racial intermarriage 
and the other requiring separate transportation accomodations for the 
races in the District of Columbii8. 2 During the first session three more 
bills proposing segregation of the District transportation facilities 
were sponsored by House members William Schley Howard of Georgia, Joseph 
B. Thompson of Oklahoma and B,yron P. Harrison of Mississippi and Thomas 
lcrisis, (February, 1914), VIl 9 188. 
2congressional Reco.rd (104 vols. to date, Washington, D.C.; Govern-
ment Priqting Office, 1873---), Sixty-third Congress, First Session, L, · 
pt. 1, 86. . 
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H. Hardwick of Georgia. The latter also was author of two joint resolu-
~ions proposing repeal of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. A 
similar joint resolution w~s introduced in the Senate by Ellison D. Smith 
of South Carolina.3 
Furthermore» during the first session attempts were made to invol!ve 
Congress in the segregation dispute between Wilson and the radicals. 
Several southern congressmen encouraged the National Democratic Fair Play 
Association, organized in Washington 9 D.C.~ to publicize alleged abuses 
in the federal civil service. On one occasion Schley Howard promised the 
Fair Play group he would work for the dismissal of all colored employees 
in the railway mail service. 4 Partly as a result of a fact-finding 
campaign by the Association, a resolution was sponsored by Senator William 
Stone of Missouri directing the Committee on Civil Service and Retrench-
ment to report on the number of Negroes in classified civil service and 
other governmental work along with their aggregate salaries. The resolu-
tion passed on May 1~ 1913» the same day the Fair Play organization held 
its first mass meeting in Washington.5 
One of the most active congressmen in the segregation controversy 
was James B.' Aswell, Representative from Louisiana» who introduced a 
measure to require segregation of civil service employee,s. 6 Moreover, he 
defended the separation policy adopted in the executive departments when 
Oswald Villard attacked the administration during a protest meeting at a 
5109. 
3 ill!!.•, pt. 1, 57, 227-228; pt. 2, 2013; pt. 3, 2071~ 2462; pt. 5, 
4New York Times~ May 4, 1913, 13. 
5congressional Record, pt. lt 878. 
6 ill!!.•, pt. 2, 1985. 
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District of Columbia church on October 27, 1913. Declaring himself a 
true friend of the Negro~ he classified Villard as an "uninformed 
enthusiast" who, if acquainted with the average Negro of the South, would 
realize that the "child race" should not be tolerated in government 
service. If, according to A~well$ the editor was properly informed, he 
would favor restricting Negroes to "the industrial fields o.f endeavor 
where the Almighty by the stamp of color decreed they should be."7 
Congressional interest in racial seijaration of government employees 
continued in the second session (December 6: 1913 to September 8, 1914), 
as House member Charles G. Edwards of Georgia sponsored a ,bill to require 
segregation. 8 Before the second session adjourned two other measures 
bearing directly on the colored race were introduced by Representativ~ 
Frank Park of Georgia. He proposed the exclusion of all Negroes as com-
missioned or non-commissioned officers in eith~r the Army or Navy. The 
second bill would authorize the acquisition of territory in Mexico for 
Negro colonization purpcses. 9 Throughout 1913 the radicals exhibited 
little concern over the racist activities in Congress since they were 
concen'trating upon Wilson. Moreover~ no action was taken on any of the 
bills that were introduced. The N.A.A.C.P. did maintain two agents in 
the capital to report any discriminatory legislation. 
In J~nuary 1914, the radicals, especially the N.A.A..C.Pq became 
directly i.nvolved in a legislative matter for the first time. This was. 
due to the agricultural extension bill providing federal aid for experi= 
mental educational projects. The mfJa.surfl was taken under considera,tion 
7 
Ibid.» pt. 7 » 411. 
8~., pt. 4» 3814. 
9 . 
!!?li·, LI 9 pt. 5» 4845; pt. 11» 11278. 
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by the Senate early in 1914. On January 28, Hoke Smith of Georgia ~::>.: .··- ! 
withdrew his pending measure in favor of the Lever .. bills which had already 
passed in the House. The following day Porter J. McCumber, North Dakota 
Republican, brought up the question of possible racial discrimina~ion 
when he expressed doubt that the colored institutions ;would gain their 
fair share in the ten southern states possessing separate agricultural 
schools, if the state legislat.t.Jres were permitted unbridled control of 
, A 
the federal appropriations. Mccumber indirectly received the support of 
Albert B. Cummins of Iowa, who 1ti 'ahswer to Smith's argument that th,· 
backwardness of the Negro justified the rural per capita method of distri-
bution, stated that if th~ Senator from Georgia was correct then p~ovisions 
/ 
should be made guaranteeing t.o the Negro institutions a fair share. This. 
provided James K. Vardman the opportunity to inject his racist arguments. 
The Negro, being an "imitatar and devoid of initiative," according to the 
Mississippi Senator-had to be led by the whites, thus there was no need 
for any division of funds.lo 
While the debate was going on in the Senate, the chief legal advisor 
of tne N.A.A.C.P. and Republican Senator Wesley Jones of Washington were 
preparing what they consid.ered a corrective amendment. 11 Offered February 
5, 1914, it required the state legislature, after dividing the funds, to 
gain approval of the allocations from the Secretary of Agriculture. Sena-
tor John Works of California endorsed the plan and expressed -the opinion 
that it would enable the Negro to obtaia the benefits without having to 
observe the demonstrations on white farms "though the fences~" The amend-
ment was rejected by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-three, primarily be-
cauJe those who sympathized with the purpose of the proposal considered a 
lOlbid'., pc-, 2, 1935, 1947; pt, 3, 2519-2520, 2649- 659. 
llcriS'is, (Marc·h, 1914), XII, 247-248. 
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plan ,by Colorado's John Shafroth more suitable. 
Under the Colorado Senator's arrangement the Secretary of Agriculture 
and the state governor would exercise joint control of the appropriations. 
The Senate accepted the Shafroth amendment plus one by Democrat Hitchcock 
of Nebraska calling for distribution without regard to race. However, 
both amendments were removed in conference, and the Smith-Lever bill 
passed without any specific provision insuring the Negro an equitable 
division. 12 The radical press urged a presidential veto, unless such 
protection was provided, but without success. 13 
The greatest threats- to the interest of the colored race came in the 
last session (December 7, 1914 to March 4, 1915) of the Sixty-third 
Congress. On January 11, 1915, the Clark bills on intermarriage and 
transportation were reported from committee. On the same day the first 
measure, declaring all racial intermarriages null and void with possible 
penalties for violation amounting to five thousand dollars and/or five 
years imprisonaent, passed the House, two hundred and thirty-eight to 
sixty. Martin B. Madden, Illinois Republican who had pleaped for an end 
to anti-Negro bills in the previous session, voiced the only opposition. 
He felt the Clark bill was unnecessary and claimed the purpose was not 
the good of both races, as claimed by Clark, but only a further attempt 
to degrade the Negro. Upon reaching the Senate the measure died in 
committee. 14 
12congressional Record, LI, pt. 3, 2929; pt. 4, 3117, 3123-3125; 
pt. 8, 7645-7646. 
13crisis, (July, 1914), VIII, 124, Baltimore Afro-American, February 
14, 1914. 
14congressional Record, LI, pt. 2, 1326-1368, 1382. 
The second bill sponsored by Clark, requiring all transportation 
companies, firms and persons within the District to provide separate 
accomodations, after being reported from committee was referred to the 
· 15 Hou·se calendar, where it died. According to the Chicago Defender, 
ec43nomic considerations by the street car company played a -rs0le in the 
bill's defeat. 16 
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The congressional action during the first Wilson administration which 
commanded the attention of all Negro leadership was amendment number 
eighteen to the Smith-Burnett literacy test immigration act,· Senator 
James A. Reed of Missouri had put forth a similar amendment on December 
31, 1914, which proposed to exclude all aliens not of the Caucasian race. 
Thes.e he stated were incapable of amalgamation. With ci.nly scattered 
southern and far western support, the a~ndment was defeated by a vote 
of forty-seven to nine. Believing the defeat could be attributed to the 
argument by Senators Henry C. Lodge and Elihu Root that the term "Cau-
casian" was ambiguous, Reed repllrased his amendment to exclude "all members 
of the African or black race • • • , 11 Mississippi Senator Williams, 
speaking in support of the proposal, argued that Orieatals, who were su-
perior to· the Negre, had already been excluded. With only one southern 
Democrat, Joseph Robinson of Arkaneas, in opposition, _and gathering six 
votes from Oregon, Idaho, California, Washington and Arizona, amendment 
number eighteen passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-five. 
On January 2, 1915,, the immigration bill was- approved· by the Senate and 
forwarded to the lower chamber.17 
1srq1d., pt. 3, 2_a21. 
16 Chicago DefendeX", March 13, 1915, editorial. 
17congressional Record, Lll, pt. 1 11 802-807, 868. 
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When the bill was taken up for debate in the House on January 7, 
1915, the Reed amendment was given first consideration. Republican 
opposition quickly appeared under the leadership of James R. Mann of 
Illinois, Representatives from Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New 
York and Massachuse.tts cited the loyalty of Negroes in past wars, praised 
their part in the construction of the Panama Canal, warned of the reper-
cua;sions on miss·ionary .work in Africa, and expressed fear that racial 
strife.~ou,ld result if the amendment was included. In addition, Madden 
interpreted the amendment to mean that Negro c;itizens who traveled abroad 
would be refused re-entry into the United States. He pleaded that the 
Negro bad suffered enough indignities without this added stamp of inferi-
ority and humifiation. 
Joe H. Eagle of Texas co~ntered with the warning that should the 
amendment fail the thirty thousand colored Panama Canal workers would 
follow their high wages to the United States. Rising to heights of which 
racists could be proud, Percy E. Quin of Mississippi, declared that the 
Negroes were the "worst leper spots, barnacles, sores and misfortunes that 
the United States had had fastened to its civilization." If the white 
people refused to meet the challenge, according to Quin, the Negro race, 
or as he preferred the "parasitic black death, 0 would bring destruction 
to the nation. Representatives Small and Aswell, of North Carolina and 
Louisiana respectively, echoed the sentiments of Quin and Eagle. 18 
The eventual failure of the proposed amendment in the House was, in 
large measure, due to two Texas Democrats, James L. Slayden and Martin 
Dies. They, with support from Alabama's John R. Burnett, appealed to 
18 Ibid., LII& pt, 2~ 1128-1138, pt. 6, 87, 91, 
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southern members to save the bill by defeating the amendment. Their argu-
ments proved successful 9 as one hundred and fifty-seven Democrats joined 
with ninety-five Republicans to defeat the am.endment by a vote of two 
hundred and fifty-two to seventy-five. 19 Without the amendment the liter-
acy test bill was passed 9 only to ' be vetoed by Wilson on January 28, 1915. 
In the sixty-fourth Congress, Reed again proposed his Negro exclusion 
amendment to a new immigration bill. It failed to gain Senate approval 
and was rejected, thirty-seven to thirty-two.20 
During the debates on the Reed amendments in Congress, the colored 
press kept close watch on all happenings and all of the race leaders, in-
cluding Booker T. Washington, denounced the amendments. 21 The Chicago 
Defender , reflecting the growing tendency of the race to use the loyalty 
appeal, pointed up the paradox of Negro troops fighting on the southern 
border against Mexican raiders to protect a country that proposed excluding 
members of their race. 22 
The leading white supremacist in Congress during Wilson's first ad-
ministration was James K. Vardaman, who had been elected to the Senate 
primarily on a program that had as its cardinal tenet repeal of the 
23 
fifteenth amendment . Although he injected the racist theme at every 
opportunity, his most abusive attacks came in March» 1914, during the 
19 
Ibid., LIi, pt. 2, 1135-1138. 
29Ibid., Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, LIV, pt. l, 207-209. 
21savannah Tribune, January 16, 1915; Baltimore ~-American, 
January 9, 1915; December 16, 1916. 
22 
Chicago Defender, January 9, 1915, editorial. 
23George C. Osborn, 1!!:m. Sharp Williams: Planter-Statesman of the 
Deep South (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1943), 156-157. 
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debate on the woman's suffrage resolution. He denounced the Negro females 
as "drunken, insolent, vulgar, ignorant and the most lawless abandoned 
creatures on earth." Even more importantly to the Senator, he believed 
they were "not so easily controlled as the males." His solution was an 
amendment to the suffrage resolution that would give the states absolute 
control of voting requirements except for sex. He was willing to support 
a reduction of congressional representation for the South if all obstacles 
to racial disfranchisement could be removed. 24 
Senators Jacob Gallenger of New Hampshirep Charles Townsend of Micbi -
gan and Moses E. Clapp of Minnesotap made brief statements opposing the 
Vardaman amendment. Francis Newlands of Nevada favored the amendment but 
feared that it would cause the suffrage resolution to be defeated. Sena-
tor Borah expressed a willingn~ss to support repeal of the fifteenth 
amendment in order to remove southern opposition to female suffrage. Re-
ceiving only one northern ·~ote» the proposal by Vardaman was rejectedp 
forty - four to twenty-one. A second amendment offered by John S. Williams 
seught to confine the extension of the suffrage to ~hite females only» 
25 
,out was defeated. 
Meat, of the southerners in Congress who discussed the Negro's role 
in the recurrent question of female suffrage, used the opportunity to ex-
hibit their hatred of the entire race. Only a few, such as Ladislas 
Lazaro of Louisiana and Thetus W. Sims of Tennessee, realized that the 
white supremacists need not shudder with horror if the resolution passed. 
They only objected to the burden that would be placed upon the South of 
24congressional Record, LI, pt . 5, 4338-4339 . 
25~., LI, pt , 5, 4213, 4960, 5094, 5100-5105. 
27 
devising legal means of preventing the extension of suffrage. 26 
Likewise, the radicals understood the situation. The best they 
\ 
could hope for was that if the women's suffrage constitutional amend-
ment was adopted and the expected disfranchisement followed in the South, 
then the rest of the United States might possibly exert some pressure for 
the enforcement of the fifteenth amendment due to the adde4 discrepancy 
of the white voter's power in the South as compared to the rest of the 
nation. 27 
Failing to enact racist legislation during the Sixty- third Congress, 
the southern extremists in the House introduced eleven new measures on 
December 6, 1915, the first day of the Sixty-fourth Congress. Four of 
the bills were directed toward preventing racial intermarriage in the 
District of Columbia, three proposed District 11Ji111-Crow" transportation 
facilities, three dealt with segregation in government serviee, and the 
remaining one was a joint resolution to repeal the fifteenth amendment . 
Authors of these proposals were familiar names from the antt-Negro 
campaign in the previous congress, including Clark of Florida, Harrison 
and Candler of Mississippi , Aswell of Louisiana, E4wards and Vinson, both 
of Georgia. These six men accounted for ten of the eleven measures . 28 
Before the first. session was over , two more bills specifically directed 
at the Negro were introduced. Samuel J ,. Tribble of Georgia wanted a nation-
wide law prohibiting racial intermarriage and Thomas Sission of Mississippi 
sponsored a resolution that would require the Attorney-General to submit 
to the Supreme Court all information bearing on the validity of the 
261bid., LIi, pt. 2, 1445, 1497. 
27crisis, (August, 1914), VIII, 180. 
28congressional Record, LIi, pt. 1, 14, 20-31, 295. 
28 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. In the Senate, Vardaman during the 
second session tried once more to gain support for a joint resolution to 
tepeal the fifteenth amendment but failed. 29 
'-
During the Sixty-fourth Congress, seventeen anti-Negro measures had 
been introduced, none of which passed. This brought the total during 
Wilson's first administration to thirty-one. But by the end of 1915, the 
racist activities in Congress began to decline or at least temporarily to 
subside. Possibly the reasons for the surface restraint» especially in 
1916, included political considerations due to the presidential election, 
the Mexican skirmishes» and the increasing involvement of the United States 
in the European War. 
The radicals, although keeping informed on the events irt Congress and 
frequently denouncing the southern extremists, more for their suspected 
role in segregation than for their legislative actions 9 continued to con-
centrate their efforts on Wilson, in whom there seemed to be some hope. 
As disappointment with the President increased, the new appeal and emphasis 
for the radicals became the importance of the Negro race in the event of a 
national crisis such as war" 
291!?!!!,, LIII 9 pt. 1, 562; pt, 2» 1543; LIV» pt. 1, 152. 
CHAPTER III 
LOYALTY AND WAR 
The Negro radicals, py 1915 , were without influence in either of 
the major parties and were in the precarious position of being labeled 
traitors to their race. ·This resulted from their alliance with the 
Democrats in 1912, just at -the time racist sentiment on the national 
level within the party was the strongest in thirty-five years. The re-
sults of their political activities seemed on the surface to provide 
~dded argument for the Washingtonian non-political orientation . 
Nevertheless, the N.A.A.C.P. maintained a steady growth. From 1912 
to 1916, the paying membership increased from three hundred and twenty-
l 
nine to eight thousand seven hundred and eighty-five. And when Booker 
I 
T. Washington advised, during the height of the segregation controversy, 
that the Negroes cease their useless protesting and reject the un-
certainties of political pursuits in order to have more time for building 
an economic foundation for progress , he was bitterly denounced by several 
\ 
of the normally non-radical colored newspapers . The Columbian Herald 
labeled the advice a "doctrine that had • • • resulted in grc;>wing up a 
generation of moral cowards • , " and the Cleveland Gazette termed it 
a "doctrine of surrender . " The Louisiana News branded Washington a "White-
Man-Made-Leader . "2 While the Tuskegee president, as a result of the 
1Kathleen L. Wolgemuth , "Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation," 
Journal 21 Negro History , (April, 1959) , XLIV » 172- 173 . 
2crisis, (November , 1914), IX » 17; (December, 1914) , IX, 71 . 
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radicals' experiences with the Demoractic administration, became even 
more convinced that the economic basis offered the only hope for the ad-
vancement of the Negro, DuBois took the position that the events under 
Wilson only proved that the Negro had left politics alone too long and 
as a result, possessed no effec~ive voice in his government. 3 
Although placed in a defensive position, due to their connections 
with the Democratic administration, the radicals had attracted consider-
able support in the struggle against: segregation of the federal depart-
ments. ln,addition, a vigorous campaign was organized in 1915 against 
th!! rac'ist mot;ion picture 11Birth of a Nation." Trotter, who had lost his 
chance for national leadership when he failed to rally support after his 
interview with Wilson, again received widespread publicity when he aided 
in the organization of over five hundred Negroes and whites in a near 
riotous protest move agaipst the movie at a Boston showing. He and five 
'4 
others were. arrested for their part in the demonstration. 
. I 
A ray of hope for the radicals' political activities came in June, 
1915, when the Supreme Court in an N.A.A.C.P .. sponsored test case voided 
the "Grandfather clause" of the Oklahoma constitution. The radicals ac-
claimed the decision as the most important political advance for. the Negroes 
since emancipation, but believed there would be little immediate signifi-
5 caace. 
Thus despite their political disappointments the radicals by agita-
tion publicized their program and created nationwide awareness and some 
sympathy for their cause. And with the increasing foreign involvements 
3 . . .I!!:!.!•, (November, 1~13), Vil, 338. 
\ 
4-wew York Times, April 18, 1915, 15. 
5 . . ' 
Crisis, (August, 1915), X, 171; (September, 1915), _X, 23,2. 
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of the United Statesp they discovered an important new source for agi-
tation and a possible basis on which to unify the efforts of all black 
citizens. 
When the European war began in 1914~ the radicals were primarily 
occupied with domestic affairs, Althou$h sympathizing with England and 
France, because of their better race politicies, the independents en-
dorsed ,the policy of neutrali~y by the United States, They regarded the 
war as being a white man's war to decide who would rule the black and 
yellow races of Asia and Africa. The invasion of Belgium had little 
effect on the radicals •. · It was regarded as "strict justice" for her 
"atrocities in the Congo."6 
Despite showing little concern with the war and professing support 
of neutrality» the opport~mities that such a crisis as a war might pro-
vide were not overlooked by the radicals. The use of colored troops by 
the Allies seemed·to offer hope for progress in race relations.7 
The radical Republican colored pr~o,. ijS repres~fited by the Chicago 
Defender and the Savannah Tf~bune 9 Wr'!iS i,oxre eq~husiasth cpncerning the 
opportunities war might create for the advan,cement of the ra<;e. While 
supporting neutrality» 8 they very clearly in 1915 expt'essed an almost 
wishful attitude about the possibility of United States involvement. 
A change from discrimination must and will come, either 
through an enlightened Aot!!rican consc.ience or through 
some great national crisis such as war.9 
6Ba1t:l~ore lt£2,-American, December 12, 1914; March 6;, 1915; (edi-
torials); Crisis, (November, 1914), IX& 28-29. 
7Baltimore Afro~American, August 8~ 1914; October 4, 1914; (editorials). 
8chicago·Defender, January 9~ 1915; May 22, 1915; June 5, 1915; (edi· 
torials). 
9.!E.!!!•, January 16, 1915 9 editorial. 
Every forward movement in the History of humanity has .• , 
been accompanied by war. 
0 0 0 0 
If war will bring a change •• , let us have war; we have 
nothing to fear.IO 
The radical Republican elements within the race that anticipated 
32 
possible benefits from a war very early adopted a threatening and bigoted 
loyalty appeal. They warned of the significance of the Negroes I role in 
a predicted future clash between the colored races, under the leadership 
of Jap~u,.~ and the whites .11 And in crder to give added emphasis to the 
importance of the black Americans, they denou~ced the European Americans 
as "hyphenated'' citizens as compared to the "true Americanism" of the 
colored race. 12 
The Negro spokesmen eager to reap the anticipated rewards of 
,patriotism for the black Americans were faced with the possibility of 
not having a military outlet for any expressi@ns of loyalty. On the st~te 
level they pleaded for the opportunity to form companies in the militia 
13 or national gucird. But by June, 1916 9 only Maryland, Ohio, IlUnois, 
the l!)istrict of Columbia, New York, Pel!'l.nsylvania, Tennessee~ Connecticut 
and Massachusetts 14 possessed organized Negro military units. On the 
national level the preparedness-minded Negroes agitated for admittance 
lOibid. ~ February 6~ 1915, editorial. 
11~., December 25~ 1915, editorial; Savannah Tribune, January 22, 
1916, editorial. 
12 Chicago Defender, Novemb~r 13, 1915; September 4: 1915; Sep.tember 
18, 1915; June 3, 1916; January 29, 1916; (editorials). 
13savannah Tribunep April 1 ~ 1916; July 29, 1916; (editorials). 
14~ York Times, May 19, 1913, 8; Baltimore Afro~American, June 
24, 1916P l. 
to federal military schools, especially in view of the acceptance of 
Orientals and the tax~supported nature of the institutions.15 
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Southern opposition to Negro participation in preparedness developed 
in Congress as four bills were introduced between July, 1914 and- July, 
1916. Two of the proposed laws would have prohibited any Negro from 
serving as an officer in the Army or Navy . The remaining measures sought 
to prevent the enlistment or reenlistment of any members of the black 
,, 
race. 16 The Negroes received the support,·of the administratton when 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker expressed disapprova~ .. of the 1916 ex-
---,. - . 
clusion bill and Rr~ised the military record of the Negro. 17 
During the summer of 191~, the preparedness group gained a practical 
example for their loyalty appeal due to the service of the Negro Tenth 
Cavalry in the Mexican punitive expedition, and especially after a 
skirmish at Carrizal late i,n June , 1916, in which the Tenth suffered 
heavy casualties. This was cited as new evidence of the Negroes' loyalty 
which could overcome prejudice, discrimination and lynchings . They 
-· 
threateningly appealed for an end t o racial hostilities and discriminations, 
by re-iterating the warning that if the United States became involved in a 
war the whites would be forced to recognize th~ importance of the black · 
18 
Americans. 
15chicago Defender, October 16, 1915, 3. 
16 · Congressional Record, Sixty-third Congress, Third Session, LII, 
pt. 3, 2827; Sixty -fourth Congress, First Session, LIII, pt. 1, 183; pt. 
4, 3721; pt. 12, 13541-13542. 
1 
17Newton D. Baker to Senator Thomas Taggart, , August 30, 1.916, Con-
gressional Record, Sixty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1111 ; pt. 15, 
2224-2225. 
18savannah Tribune, June 24, 1916, editorial; C6ilago Defender, June 
24, 1916, editorial. 
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After Carrizal, Emmett Scott, Secretary of both Tuskegee Institute 
and''the National Negro Business League, who, along with Robert Moton, 
Washington's successor as President of Tuskegee, was the leading spokes-
man of the Washingtonian race philosophy, joined the bigoted patriotism 
campaign. H.e praised tb.e loyalty of the Negro soldie·rs that had no 
taint of being ''hyphenated. 11 19 
The radicals also made use_. of Carrizal as an argument for equal 
rights. The Mational Equal Rights League suggested local citizens' com-
mittee be organized throughout the nation to push for full citizenship 
20 
us~nf the loyalty appeal. H.owever, the radicals were critical of the 
administration's ~xican policy. DuBois labeled the Carrizal incident 
a ~l,fY for the black men who d!_pd for a country that despised, cheated 
and lyllched them, but also for ~be Mexicans who dared to defend their 
country ~tom invasion. 21 The stand taken by Secr,etary of Wal.i, Bak_et' a-
88:;inst the legro. exclusic;>n bill was regarded as an "eleventh hour politi-
' . 
cal concession py -~he De~c,crats •11 22 
Although making use of the loyalty ap~eal, some of the radicals were 
not as optimistic about war service and its rewards. They, praised the 
military record of the black race but also pointed out that it had ac>t 
resulted itt full citizenship iu the past. 23 Also the assertic:,n. that the 
' ' 
black citizens W&1re ready and anxious to serve, without prior evidence 
of ap~reciation, was questioned. 
19Baltimore ~-American, July 1, 1916, 1. 
20ibid., July 1, 1916, 1. 
21 . 
Crisis, {August, 1916), XII, 165. 
221alti111,o:re ~cAmericaa; September 16, 1916, editorial. 
· 23lbid., July 15, -1916, editorial. 
It is tak•n for granted that the colored people will enlist 
for the animal love of fighting • • • return home • • • to 
the li11.it;!!d rights as citizens, to be discriminated against, 
segregated. and lynched.24 
••• it appears that the colored people are no more ready 
to die than the white people •. •nd why should the Neg-foes 
fight and die ••• if they ,.cannot \rote and not receive the 
consider4tion of huilan beings.25 · 
The N.A.A.c.P.\split on preparedness. Oswald G. Villard and other 
prominent .leaders -w~re opposed because of their pacifist beliefs.· 
35 
DuBois, in May, 1916, after the passage of a National Defense Act giving 
the President the power to make increases in the ·strength of the Army, 
endorsed Negro participation. He suggested the formation of two artillery 
26 
and two infantry_ Negro regiments. A similar proposal had been lllSde to 
Secretary of War Garrison in December, 1915, by Captain R.P. Root, who 
had served with the colored Eighth Illinois Voluntary Infantry during 
the Spanish American War. 27 
With the N.A.A.C.P. endorsement of segregated prepare4ness there 
seemed to be a possibility of uniting the efforts of the race leaders. 
But almost immediately differences app~ared. Objections were voic~d a-
gaJnst segregatec4· regiments. ''He Lthe Negr2,/ must have it understood 
that he is an American, not a Negro soldier, and that he is representative 
., ,of .niae.ty ~illions, not of ten millions." 28 Seme we,re willing tC!> support 
the plan if the regiments were commanded by colored officers. 29 The more 
., 
24Ibid., June 19, 1915, editorial. 
25Ibid., July 22, 1916, edito~ial. 
26 ( 6) 4 Crisis, May, 191 , XII, O. 
21Chicago De~ender, December 18, 1915 9 1 • 
.. 
28ialtimore !£!!,•American, June 3, 1916, editorial. 
29Ibid., July 1, 1916, edi~orial; August 19, 1916, (quoting Pittsburgh 
Courier). 
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militant preparedness element were more concerned and resolute in their 
' 
' ~ 
opposition to segregation being permitted when it c•me to "defending a 
common flag. 1130 
Despite differences on preparedness there was eonsiderable race 
unanimity on President Wilson's foTeign policy. Only neutrality proved 
satisfactory to tu Negre leader,s. The favorite targets of criticism 
were the United States• warnings to Germany and Turkey. The colored press 
expressed the belief that the United States should ''put their own house in 
'order," especially lynchings, before Judging other nations. 31 The 1915 
occupation of strife~ridden Haiti by American marines was condemned and 
contrasted to the administration policy of merely warning Germ.any. 32 The 
disapp:roval of tb.e Huerta dictatorship in Mexico seemed:meaningless to 
the Negroes, who felt it could be no worse than the "southern dictators. 033 
Even on neutrality the general approval was not without occasional 
dissent. The S4ttHJi~gly ,pro-Allied orientation did not go unnoticed. 
England continues to molest the shipping of this country by 
capturing si!:eamers 9 searching them and giving annoyance in 
many forms.' To all of these outrages ••• the administra-
tion seems unmovedo On the other hand the least action of 
Germany is vehemently protested against.34 
.As the election of 1916 approached, the Republican colored pres's 
became more critical of the neutrality policy. An example of this wa.s 
30 Chtc'!lgo Defendert August 19, 1916, editorial. 
3lsavannah Tribune, October 16, 1915 1 editorial; Chicago :Defender, 
.August 28, 1915; August 5, 191(>; (editorials); Crisis, (March, 1916), XI, 
243; Baltimore .Afro-American, September 12, 1914, editorial. 
32savannah Tribune, August ·28, 1915, editctrial; Baltimore~-
. American, August 28, 1915, editorial; Chicagp Defender, October 30, 1915, 
editorial; Cris1is, (O.ctober, 1915), X, 291. 
33)Jal,timore Afro.1oAaerica?, Apri11 25, 1914, ed.itoria-1. 
' 
3r4s·av1imn1:1,b TI]:ibune, December 4·, 1915, editorial. 
.: .... 
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the Chicago Defender, which endorsed· neutrality in 191,5 and again in 
. . . 
1917, 35 but in a November, 1916 editQrial announcbig support of Charles 
Evans Hughes, declared Wilson was "simply making cowards of us all in the 
eyes of the world so that we may have the satisfaction of knowing he kept 
us out of war. u36 
The Republicans quite naturally enjoyed the Negroes' disappointment, 
both dotaestic and foreign, with the Wi1lson administratian. Attempts to 
regain the rebellious colored voters of 1912 began as early as the spring 
of 1914. The Boston Advertiser urged the use of Negro disfranchisement 
in the South as a rallying point upon which the Party could be united.37 
Senator Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania proposed to introduce a bill to 
bring about enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The colored 
Pittsburgh Courier, admittedly pro-Penrose and pro-Republican, labeled 
the bill a hoax and a cheap attempt to rejuvenate the "down and out" 
Republican Party.38 
The Republican 1fegro press re-.inded the radicals and others who had 
supported Wilson in 1912, of the promises to the race that had been 
broken and warned them to beware of being caught again by a "few sops0 
on the eve of the caapaign. 39 Also the independents were informed that 
since the President was southern born and "a rank southerner at heart," 
they should have expected that he would surround himself with fdemons ~ 
35 Chicago Defender, February 10, 1917, editorial. 
36 !!?..!!!•, November 4, 1916, editorial. 
37crisis, (March, 1914), Vll 9 229. 
38lbicl., (February, 1916.), XIII, 182. 
39savannah Tribune, February 27, 1915, editorial. 
38 
such as Tillman, Hok-_ Smith, Vardaman and the l1ke.u40 
The radicals did not need to be reminded of their misplaced faith 
in Wilson. All of those major race spokesmen who had supported the 
national Democratic ticket in 1912 9 with the exception of Bishop Walters, 
completely repudiated Wilson by 1916. As one radical newspaper sumnied 
it up, "any Negro whe would v.o*e for him LWUso!.7 must be either a fool 
· 41 . . . 
or a knave." Alex~nder Walters, undoubtedly, disappointed with the 
President's patronage policies, nevertheless continued to support the 
Democratic Party. Apparently his only major objection was that race 
leaders had not been consulted more frequently.42 
Although the·rapicals were bitter in their denunciation of Wilson 
and the Democrats, the Republican nominee, Charles E. Hughes, did not 
create much enthusiasm among them. His campaign appeal to tQe black 
,, 
Americans consisted of one speech made·on November 6, 1906, during his 
campaign for the governorship of ~ew York and a cautious statement to ai· 
delegation of colored men in New York City after receiving the presi-
. I 
dential nominat~n. He vaguely outlined his stand as being ~pe 11Ameri-
c~nism of equality of oppertµnity, character and intelligence with no 
color line. 043 The Republican campaign literature included a summary of 
Wilson's treat\1lent of the colored citizens. It was written by a Negro, 
Henry Lincoln Johnson~ who served as Recorder of Deeds during the Taft 
I . 
administration. Cabinet members McAdoo, Williams and Burleson along with 
the President were denounced for instigating segregation. Replacement of 
40chicago Defender, July 29, 1916; September 23, 1916; (editorials). 
~41Baltimore Afr~~American, October 28, 1916, editorial. 
42crisis, (Deceqiber, 1914), IX 9 74. 
43~ ~ Times, August 25, 1917, l; October 9, 1917, 22; December 12, 
1917, 7; September 25, 1918, 9; Baltimore Afro-American .Jovem.ber 24, 1917, 
editorial; January 5, 1918, l; "Houston Riot;" Outlook tseptember 5, 1917). 
colored employees by whites under Wilson was compared unfavorably with 
Taft's Negro patronage record.44 
DuBois in October, 1916, presented the situation faced by the 
radicals and attempted to provide a basis for future political action. 
The llegro voter enters the present campaign with no enthusiasm. 
Four years ago the intelligent Negro voter tried a great and 
important experiment. He knew that the rank and file of the 
Bourbon de111ocracy was without sense or reason, based on pro-
vincial ignorance and essentially uncivilized, but he saw 
called to its leadership a man of high type and one who 
promised specifically to American Negroes, justice • • • • 
They have lived to learn that this statement was a 
lie 0 0 0 0 
They are forced, therefore, to vote for the Republican 
candidate, Mr. Hughes$ aad they find ther• little that is 
attractive. 
Cl' O O • 
• • • the Negro must expect from him, as chief executive, 
the neglect, indifference and misunderstan.di!lg that be has 
had fro!ll recent Republican presidents-. 
o O O 0 
~e say nothfng·concerning the Socialist.candidate. 
They are excellent leaders of an excellent party; God send 
them. success! Tbrere is for the future one. and only one 
effective politidal move for colored voters. 
0 0 0 0 
It is a move of segregation ••• but self defense 
knows no nice hesitations. The American :Negro must either 
vote as a unit4~r continue to be politically emasculated 
as at present. " , 
The execution of the plan could only be bro_µght about, according· 
to DuBois, by organization in every congressic1>nal district of a Negro 
party to endorse those candidates that would "give thea greatest hope 
for the remedying of the wrongs done the Negro race." And if no such 
. I I 
candidate was available the colored citizens should neminate one of 
46 their own. 
39 
44Republican Campaign Textbook, (inued by the Republican National 
Committee, 1916), 238, 316•381. 
45crisis, (October, 1916) t Xllp 268. 
46 Ibid., 269. 
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Whe-n Hughes failed to respond to a September ques:tionnaire seeking 
his position on lynching, dis·franchisement, patronage prejudice and race 
hatred, the radicals ;ere' ~\ren less en~husiastic over •t;he Republican ·, 
nominee., .. DuBois warned the Republicans that they did not yet have "five 
·' 
hundred thousand Negro votes in their pockets." He declared that no 
Negro could vote for Woodrow Wilson, but that he could vote for Allan 
L. ltenson, the Socialist candidate~ or stay at home on election day. 47 
Despite the independents' political frustrations, events were taking 
place,~~hat seemed to offer the potential for future political action. 
As the .world war stimulated American industry and curtailed foreign 
immigration, the labor demand and higher wages in the North began to 
attract Negroes from the South. Crop failures in 1915 and 1916due 'to 
floods and boll weevil contributed to the -Negro migrations north. Other 
motivatin,g factors included inadequate schools~ lack of political equality 
·. 48 
and mob violence in the South, 
Booker T. Washington shortly before his death in November, 1915 9 
had announced a "go south rural'' campaign. 49 However, the radicals 
50 
praised and agitated for the northern migration 1 while by 1918 even 
Washington's successor as President---of Tuskegee, Robert Moton~ gave bis 
47Ibid., (November, 1916), XIUi> 17. 
48crisis, (February, 1916), XII~ 179; (March, 1917)~ XIII, 233; (June, 
1917), XIV 9 63-64; (Quoting the Montgomery (Ala.) Advertiser, Atlanta 
Constitution, Charleston News ~Courier, and St. Louis Globe-Democrat); 
(June, 1917), XIV 9 77; Emmett J. Scott 9 Negro Migration During fil!!!, 
(Washington, D.C.; Oxford University P-ress, American Brap.ch, 1920), 13-
25. 
49!!!! York Times, August 21, 1913, 6; April 20, 1914, 11. 
50Chicago Defender, August 5, 1916 9 6; Baltimore Afro-American» 
November 18, 1916; November 25, 1916; December 2, 1916; (editorials). 
blessing to the movement.51 The independent preas in 1916 and 1917, 
acclaimed the new economic opportunities as a "second emancipation" 
and the end of economic slavery for the Negro wage earner. They 
attacked the Washingtonian advise of "accumulate property/' 0 stick to 
·~ 
41 
the soil," "the soutlt is the Negro's best friead 11 and "back to the 
farm. 1152 DuBois viewed the migration a:s the only effective way to pro-
test against the lynchings» lawlessness, industrial oppression and dis-
franchisement in the South.53 
The political implications of the movement were obvious. As the 
Negro migrated north he in effect gained suffrage. As early as the 
election of 1916, the political significance became apparent. Senator 
John W. Kern of Indiana and several Democratic district attorneys in 
Illinois and Indiana complained of and charged that vote colonization 
was taking place. As a result of the complaints, federal and l~fal 
inves.tiga tions were launched in Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois and New York. Alvin T. Hert, manager of the western Republican 
headquarters in Chicago, denied the charges.54 
Therefore, by 1916 the Negro leaders·not only were aware of the 
possible gains from an idealistic atmosphere which a war might produce 
but also recognized the more tangible and immediate p~litical.and eco-
nomic benefits. 
51 !!!!!, York Times, February 1, 1918, 7. 
52Baltimor•·Afro=Am.erican, July 29, 1916; Chicago Defender,. October 
28, 1916; Augast 5, 1916; 'Savannah Tribune, January 1, 1916; (editorials). 
53crisis, (October, 1916), XII, 270. 
54New ~ Times, October 18, 1916, 11; November 7, 1916, 3; November 
15, 1916, 1. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIGHT TO SERVE 
After the election of 1916, the Negro spokesmen again concentrated' 
their attention on the anticipation of service by the race in a time of 
crisis. The bigoted threatening loyalty appeal to be included in pre-
1 paredness continued, as did the attacks on the paradox of statements 
to foreign nations about government by the consent of the governed and 
protection of humanity, while ten million citizens in the United States 
were disfranchised and subject to mob action. 2 And the optimism that a 
war would bring advancement for the race remained strong among some • 
• . • American prejudice is akin to insanity and doubtless 
a disastrous war with some powerful nation will be the only 
means of bringing Uncle Sam's children to their senses.3 
If a war must come to driv;e them /the whites/ to ,=heir 
senses, as horrible as it 'is, let-it .come. -And when the 
smoke of battle clears ..• perhaps our rightful place 
... will be awarded us,4 
Late in March, 1917, the Negro advocates of preparedness obtained 
another practical example for their campaign. On March 25, 1917, the 
First Separate Battalion, the colored unit of the District of Columbia 
National Guard, was summoned to guard the water supply system, the 
1savannah Tribune, February 10, 1917; March 10, 1917; Chicago~ 
fender, February 24, 1917; (editorials), 
2Chicago Defender, February 3, 1917, editorial. 
3tbid., March 3, 1917, editorial. 
4 Ibid., M~rch 24, 1917, editorial. 
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reservoirs and the power plants of the District. Ignoring the reason given 
by the President that the decision had been dictated by a desire not to 
affect industrial production in the calling of the Guard, the Negro leaders 
claimed the real concern was the doubtful loyalty of hypenated white 
5 
units. 
The majority of the N.A.A.C.P. leadership, DuBois. the Republican 
colored press, and the Washiagtonians continued to exert pressure for 
Negro participation in the preparedness movement. They asserted the loyal-
ty of th' black race and maintained hepes of great benefits from a possible 
war. However, some of the radical press remained doubtful that benefits 
could be derived from military service or that any great race enthusiasm 
to serve their nation existed under the prevailing conditions. 
Involvement in a European War would merely postpone the Negro 
problem for the duration and the loss of the best men of the 
race would perhaps throw the Negro's cause back a decade.6 
o O o 0 
Why--~ould I Lt.he Negrg_.f be shot in protesting against ruth· 
lessn~ss on the European continent whea there is ruthlessness 
in my home town that I cannot protest too loudly against?7 
As for the praise given to .the extraordinary loya_lty of the Negro, 
they felt this was not necessarily something of whi.ch to be proud. 
HNeither have our domestic animals ever ••• turned against their country. 
Far be it from them, they ~ave never had sense enougb."8 The extreme 
radicals differed from the N.A.A.C.P. and DuBois in that they wanted 
5savannah Tribu~e, March 31, 1917 9 l; Baltimore !£.!!.~American, March 
31, 1917, editorial; Emmett J. Scott, American Negro !.!, £!!!. World· !!I, (n. 
p., 1919}, 35-38.- ------- .. 
6Baltimc~e !!!:.2,-American, March 10, 1917, editorial. 
7.!!?.!.,g,., February 10, 1917, editorial. 
8Ibid., March 24, 1917, editorial. 
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concessions prior to participation and were not content to agitate while 
eagerly offering their services. Any other position, they argued, was 
too close to the Washingtonian accomodation attitude.9 Even after war 
was declared they, although denouncing any talk of rebellion, demanded 
10 full citizenship rights before "going to war willin.gly." 
The major concern of the Negro preparedness advocates in the winter 
of 1916-1917, and the spring of 1917, was a training camp for Negro offi-
cers. Late in 1916 General Leonard Wood offered to establish an instruc-
tion camp, for potential colored officers beginning in the summer of 1917. 11 
The offer drew almost immediate response as Joel Spingarn, the white Chair-
man of the Executive Committee of the N.A.A'~C.P., issued a national call 
for the Negroes to support ~he plan. 
It is of the highest importance that the educated colored men 
of this country should be given opportunities for leadership. 
You must cease to remain in the background in every field of 
national activityt and must come forward to assume your right 
places as leaders of American life All of you cannot be 
lea'ders, but those of you who have the capacity for leader-
ship must be given an opportunity to test and display it. 
There is now just such an opportunity possible for you» 
in case of war 9 to become leaders and officers in.stead of 
followers and privates. Major General Leonard Wood, of the 
United States Army~ commanding the Department of the East, 
has promised that if two hundred of·you apply for admission, 
he will organize and maintain a military training camp for 
colored men, with just the sort of training to fit you to 
serve .as officers of volunteers in case of war. 
I do not believe that colored men should be separated 
froin other Ameicana in any field of life; but the crisis is 
too near a,t hand to discuss principles and opinions, and it 
seems to me that there is only one thing for you at this 
juncture; and that it is to get the training that will fit 
you to be officers, however and,wherever and whenever thi! 
9 !!:?!!•, March 31, 1917 9 editorial. 
lOibid., April 7, 1917, editorial, 
11c · i .. r1.s s ~ (Novemberj 1916) 9 XUI, 30 • 
t~aining may ~e obtained. If two hundred of you do not send 
appliy,tions immediately, the opportunity may be lost, for-
ever. 
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Despite receiving the endorsement and support of the colored educa-
tional institutions, including Tuskegee, and of the N.A.A.C.P., DuBois 
and much of the llegro press,13 the propesal receivedoppositien from 
the extreme radicals. They maintained their position of being opposed 
to any form of segregation in or out of the military notwithstanding 
periods of emergency or crisis. The argument by DuBois, Spingarn, 
Colonel Charles Young, the ranking active colored of fie-er, and others, 
that the separate camp would be the only way Negroes would obtain com-
missions, had no effect on the extreme radicals~ 
If this government cannot discuss principles and opinions 
so far as they relate to common justice to the Negro when 
there is no crisis, perhaps a crisis is ,the best time to 
get a hearing.14 
0 0 • 0 
• the Negro who-speaks of duties where he has no f"ights 
places himself in the pogition where he may deserve the 
name - - a moral coward. Have we regard, respect, reverence, sin-
cere and dee1>i, for this government 9 then let us speak of duty. 
Until we have won the political 9 social and economic freedom 
, that any other citizen 'of the United States enjoys, we have 
bqt one duty, and that is to fight the battle for inner 
freedom. Our greater enemies are within.15 
They expr•ssed the conviction that the Spingarn camp would cnly pro-
vide ·a -boost to segregaUon16 and hyphenated A.merican.ism. 
12Baltimore M!:!,-American 9 February 24, 1917 » editorial. 
13scott, Negro!!\ World-!!!,, 82; Baltimore ~~American, March 
24, l; March 21, l; Savannah Tribune, Mar-ch 31, 1917, editor.ial. 
14Baltimore Afro-American, February 24, 1917 9 editC!)"rial. 
15Ibid., March 17, 1917, editorial. 
16 
!!?!!!•, March 31, 1917, editorial. 
Though it might seem too idealistic to have mixed regiments, 
that is what Uncle Sam will be compelled to do, if we are 
to have a united country •••• When a separate training camp 
is established for the Irish, German, Italian, Swede, and all 
other hy~henate~ Americans, then, and not until then, will we 
consider it our duty to support such an organization.17 
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The opposition to the Spingarn plan had litt~e success in discouraging 
participants, as over two hundred and eighty applications were received by 
April, 1917,is However~ those supporting the proposal became uneasy, es-
pecially after war was declared, as no official 1itord was received frGm 
the War Department relative to th' camp~ When Spingarn pressed for some 
action he was told by Wood that the War Department had to approve the 
camp, whereas the War Department informed Spingarn that General Wood was 
in complete command. 19 During February and April, three resolutions were 
introduced in Congress in an attempt to secure authorization for an offi-
cers' training camp for Negroes.20 'JC'he Central Committee of College Men, 
organized to carry the plan into effect, early in May, 1917 aired their 
views before Congress in a memorandum presented by Senator Gallinger. 
The Negro 9 a ever~ loyal and patriotic, is anxious to do his 
full share in the defense and support of his country in its 
fight for democracy. The Negro welcomes the opportunity of 
contributing his full quota to the Federal Army •••• He 
feels very strongly that these Negro troops should be offi-
cered by their own men. 
The memorandum also summarized the events that led the Negroes to 
the decision to support a colored officers' training camp. It stated 
that since the authorization by the War Department of fourteen camps to 
open on May 14, 1917~ for the training of officers 9 made no provisions 
17chicago Defender, April 7, 1917, editorial. 
18crisis, (May, 1917), XIV, 37; Baltimore Am,-American, April 7J 
1917, l. 
19Baltimore Afro-American, April Z8, 1917 » l. 
20congressional Record 9 X.IV 9 pt. 4, 3320; LV, pt. 1, 169 9 502. 
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for Negroes, and since the Department had declared that i.t was impracti-
cable to admit black citizens to these ca~ps 9 .then the Negro college 
students and graduates woul'li join the campaign to bring about the es-
tablhhment of a camp for colored citizens. 21 
On May 8, 1917» the day following the presentation of tbe memorandum 
by Gallinger, Representative Murray Hulbert of New York sent a letter to 
Secretary of War Baker seeking authorization of an officers• training camp 
for Negroes. he week later A.djutant-Gen,eral H.P. McCain in a letter to 
Hulbert stated that such a training camp was under consideration and the 
details would be released as soon as a decision was reached. The official 
announcement came in the form of a memorandum from tb.e Adjuta-at~General I s 
office on May 23, 1917. A camp was to be established at Ft. Des Moines, 
Iowa, under Colonel c.c. Ballou, Colonel Charles Castle and twelve West 
'\ 
Point instructors beginning on June 18, to train 1,250 Negroes as captains 
and lieutenants for anticipated colored regiments. Two hundred, and fifty 
of the trainees would be select,ed from non-commissioned Regular Begro offi-
cers, with the remaining one thousand being drawn from enlistees or members 
of the National Guard. Of the two hundred and fifty Regulars theJ!linth 
Cavalry was to furnish twenty-five, the,Teath Cavalry fifty-seven, the 
Twenty-fourth Infantry eighty-four, and the remaining eighty-four were to 
c'~me from the Twenty-fifth Infantry. 22 
After the official announcement the Central Committee of Negro College 
.Men, with headquarters at Howard University 9 and the B.A.A.C.P. intensified 
their efforts to rally the support of all colored university graduates 
-2i1~t"d., LV, pt. 2, 1896. 
22lbid., LV, pt. 8, appendix, 246. 
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behind the camp. 23 · Late in July, 1917, the War Department announced that 
the Des Moines camp would be entirely infantry due to lack of facilities 
and a shortage of non-commissioned colared instructors. 24 
The strong southern opposition» expected by the colored leaders, 25. 
against the inclusion of Negroes i~ the military mobilization failed to 
materialize, and most of the objections originated within the race. Tb.e 
South did express some concern over the arming of Negroes and the loss 
of labor due ta con.scriptian, especially in view of the heavy Negro labor 
migration north. And the effect war service could have on white supremacy 
was noted by the Negroes and southerners alike. 26 Southern opposition 
was possibly lessened due to the decision by the War Department to have 
segregated military training.27 
During the summer of 1917 9 the agitation by the radicals became more 
threatening. They demanded restoration of the Civil War colored state 
militia units and an end to discrimination in the armed forces. 28 DuBois, 
discouraged by the delay in the incorporation of legroes into the war 
mobilization, sounded the d~al hope and threat of the race. 
If they do not want us to fight, we will work. We will walk 
into the industrial shoes of a few million whites who go to 
the front. We will get higher wages and we cannot be stopped 
23crisis, (June, 1917), XlV 9 60-61; Chieago 9 Defender, June 2, 1917, 
. editorial. 
24Baltim9re Afro-Americani August 4, 1917, 1. 
25~., January 27, 1917, editorial. 
26~'Negro Conscription,"!!!. Republic, .(October 20, 1917),.Xll 9 317-
318; Chicago Defend.er, April 14, 1917 • editorial; Savannah Tribune, April 
14, l; April 14, 1917 9 editorial. 
27Baltimore !!.I!.".'American, May 5, 1917, 1. 
28savannah Tribune, May ·26, 1917, editorial. 
' 
by all of the deviltry of the slave South; particularly with 
the white lynchers and mob leaders away at war. 
If we fight we'll learn the fighting game and cease to be so 
•iaislily lynched." If we don't fight we'll learn the more 
lucrative trades and cease to be so easily robbed and ex-
ploited. Take your choice, gentlemen.29 
The militant Republ~can colored press, the H.A.A.C.P. , the independent 
Negro press and the Equal Rights League were united in firm oppositi~n 
to the rumored plans for conscription of Negroes for farm labor. 30 
In Bew York City on Jµly 28 , 1917, eight thousand black citizens 
marched in a silent parade pretesting disfranchisement , race riots and 
segregation. They carried banners pleading with Wilson to bring demo-
cracy to the United States before carrying it to Europe. 31 
' The extreme radical colored press continued to demand concessions 
49 
before supporting the war effort. They suggested that the United States 
"sat at liberty {theiJ own slaves before recommending liberty for the 
slaves of other countries," and establish democracy not just for whites 
and foreigners.32 Edward Marshall, the editor of the Richmond Planet , 
/-
a Negro weekly, in commenting on his successful fight to get his paper 
delivered through the mails after it was held up for "interfering with 
the mobilization of United States forces," declared: 
••• I shall consider myself a disgrace to my race and 
my country by freely volunteering to fight for a Democracy 
across the sea ••• unless President Wilson assures pro-
tection to the 12,000,000 colored people.33 
29 Crisis, (June, 1917), XIV, 62. 
30ilalti1RGre ~-American, July 28, 1917, l; Chicago Defender, July 
28, 1917, l. 
31New!filTimes , July 29, 1917 , 12. 
32Baltimore Afro-American, April 28 , 1917; May 5, 1917; May 12, 1917, 
July 7, 1917; (editorial). 
331bid., August 11, 1917, editorial. 
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In a special e~itorial Robert S. Abbott, owner and publisher of the 
Chicago Defender, urged Negro,s to take advantage of their new econo~ic 
power resulting from the labor demand and quit: their jobs in protest 
wherever segregation prevailed. 
If there ever was a time to strike for freedom in its broadest 
sense, that time is right now. Supply and demand regulate 
everything; our services are more in demand now than ever be= 
fore, and the demand will increase as time gees on.34 
The threats, demands and appeals ~'f the radical spokesman during the 
" 
spr!ll.g and early suDIJller ef 1917 restec!l on the hopes that war service would 
be rewarded willingly or unwillingly 9 and that the conditions produced by 
thf! war would aid the advancement of the race. However, late in May and 
again late in August, race riots occurred th•t threatened to nullify the 
oppqrtunities created- by the war and to excluc!le the Negroes from the 
future benefits, both economic and idealistic, that the war seemed to 
offer. 
On the night of May 28, 1917, in East St. Louis, Illinois, after more 
than a month of tension between whites and Negroes over the recent colored 
migrations to the area 9 racial clashes began which developed iato a maJor 
race riot that lasted fer five days. Order was finally established on 
Jbue 4 9 by twenty-one companies of the federal aad state National Guard 
under the personal supervision of Governcr Lowden of Illinois. During the 
five·days, three hundred and ten.Negro homes were burned, thirty-three 
N~groes aiid four whites were killed. The total damage estimates ran as 
high as -three million dollars. The riot was made worse by the inefficiency, 
if ·not cowardice, of the Rational Guard and several of the city officials. 
Thousands of the recently arrived Negro workers fled into Missouri during 
34Chicago•Befen.der, August 4, 1917» editori,1. 
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the riots. 
Protests were sent to Wilson by the Freedmen Foundation, representing 
twenty-five Negro organizations in Chicago, Dr. Moton of Tuskegee and the 
N.A.A.C.P., the Equal Rights League and the Baltimore ~-American placed 
the blame for the riot on the trade unions who sought to deny the Begro 
his economic salvation. Theodore Roosevelt inferred a similar charge 
during a New York City meeting of the American Friends of Russian Freedom 
organization. Samuel Gompers and other American Federation of Labor spokes-
men denied the charges and attribu~ed the trouble to the labor recruiting 
agents of business. Herbert H. Harrison, president of the Liberty League 
of Negro Americans, an organization of which Trotter was chairman, during 
the riots urged Negroes to arm themselves for protection.35 
The East St. Louis ,. riot cotlllllanded Congressional attention on July 5, 
1917, when Senator Thomas of Colorado interjected the riot into a debate 
on prohibition. He reprimanded the American people and press for not de-
~~ 
nouncing the riot. He compared the disorder to the atrocity of Belgium. 
The Senator pointed out the necessity of protecting the loyalty of the 
Negro race in view of the great crisis faced by the country. Senator 
Sherman of Illinois blamed the International Workers of the World, the 
criminal element and the "infernal, lawless, and damnable saloons," for 
the riots.36 
Four days later on July 9, 1917, Representative Dyer of Missouri 
introduced a resolution that would authorize the formation of a joint 
35Baltimore Afro-American, July 7, 1917, l; !!l!, ~ Times, May 30, 
1917, 6; May 31, 1917, 12; July 3, 1917, 1, 6; July 4, 1917, l; July 5, 
1917, 9; July 6, 1917 , 18; July 7, 1918, 1$ 4; July 8, 1917, 11, 3. 
36congressional Record, LV, pt. 5, 4698, 4701. 
52 
committee representing the Senate, House and Judiciary, to investigate 
the causes that led to the East St. Louis trouble and determine remedial 
legislation. 37 A similar resolution was introduced in the Senate by 
Sherman. It -differed from the Dyer measure in that the committee was to 
represent only the Senate and House , with five representatives from each. 
Another House resolution was introduced conforming to the Sherman pro-
posal. 38 
The two leading southern white supremacists in the Senate, Tillman 
and Vardaman, supported the Sherman resolution but used the opportunity 
I 
to expand their race philosophy . The South Carolinian blamed the trouble 
on the I.W.W., who he claimed induced Negroes from the South for the 
purpose of replacing white labor. Tillman's solution was that the Negro 
should remain in the South . During his discussion of the East St . Louis 
riott Tillman digressed long enough to approve of northern white troops 
being sent South for training, "because they would learn more about the 
Negro and like him less as a result . 1139 
Vardamant in announcing his support of the resolution t expressed 
satisfaction that the American people were being awakened to the fact 
that the race problem was no longer purely southern or sectiona.40 Exactly 
one month later on August 16, 1917$ after the Sherman resolution had been 
reported favorably from committeet41 the Mississippi Senator cited the 
371bid. , 4879. 
38.!l?!.g,., 5084, 5145. 
39.!l?!.g,., 5150- 5152. 
40 
.!l?!g_., 5153 . 
41 
~., LV, pt . 6, 5954. 
East St. Louis racial strife as evidence for his racist doctrine. 
Regrettable ••• yes; ••• but on the other hand 
it is the outward expression, cruel and brutal though it 
may be, of that inward, dominant, and dauntless spirit of 
the white man, which would prefer death rather than sur-
render its superiority or ¥i.eMl in any way ••• to the 
less favored and ••• i'srferiOT race. It is the manifesta-
tion of that old quality of Caucasian race pride which has 
stood guard with -drawn sword to preserve the purity of the 
Caucasian race ••• 
We are threatened ••• with the ••• effects of the 
"melting pot" of war, and merging of races, and the en-
forced equality and solidarity of citizenship. 
53 . 
Vardaman re-iterated his racist warning that "political equality breeds 
social equality whose offspring is race amalgamation and thus race de-
terioration which would mean the death of American civilization." He 
warned of the dafiiers of arming the Negro, especially in view of the 
activities of German agents.42 
While Congress was involved with the Shelt'Dlan resolution a potentially 
much greater misfortune, the Houston riot, befell the Negroes who were 
anxious to reap the rewards of war service. The Houston riot occurred 
on August 23, 1917, when over one hundred and twenty-five Negro members 
of the Twenty-fourth Infantry , stationed in Houston , under the command 
of a sergeant , began indiscriminately to fire at residents because of 
alleged mistreatment of several members of the regiment by local police. 
As a result of this action , a riot was started that led to the death of 
seventeen persons. The army arrested one hundred and fifty-six suspected 
participants from the Twenty-fourth and moved the remaining members of 
_! 
the regiment to Columbia , Bew Mexico. Eventually eighteen were hanged 
42 
Ibid., 6061 -6067. 
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and ninety-nine imprisoned for their part in the riot. 43 
The Heuston riot created more southern opposition to ·Negro partici-
./ pation in the military effort than any other evento Southern eengressmen 
and gover~ors, led by Governor Manning of South Carolina and Representa-
tive Schley ll.ow_ard of Georgia, bolstered by h_ome tGWa support £rem the 
chambers of cemmerce, protested any further training of Negro troops in 
the South and demanded the withdrawal !)f these already' stationed in\ 
44 .. 
southern cantonments. Cengressman Howard suggested to the War Depart-
meat that if Negrees Wtire to be trained in tke South they should be 
\ 
strictly segregated and white units -should be stationed nearby in the 
event trouble developedo45 
Due to the pressure exerted on the War Department as a result of the 
Houston riot, all assignments of colored draftees were suspended on August 
29, 1917.46 Two days late~Wilson met with Moton to discuss the situa-
47 · 
tion. Also ll the War Department called a conference of Negre leaders and 
promin•nt white persons interested in the Negro problemo Those attending 
the meeting incll)ded Moton, Emmett J. Scott, .Oswald G. Villard and Oeerge 
48 
F. Peabody. The colored press condemned the rioters but attacked the 
43New York Times, August 25, 1917, l; October 9, 1917, 22;0December 
12, 1917 9 7; S~ptember 25, 19189 9; ~altimere !!!.2,·American, November 24, 
1917. editoriai; Ja.nuary 5, 19,18, lr 0 Houstoa Riot/1 Gutloek (September 
S, 1917), CXVI~» lOcll. 
44scott, Negro !!. lli. World!!!:., 75=76; !!!! ~· 'l'itaes, August 25, 
1917, l; August 27, 1917; 7; August 28, 1917, 18; August 31, 1917, 4; 
Congressional Recordl> __ LV 9 pt. 7, 6467, 7243. 
. ~ 
45itew ·!!I!. Times, August 26, 1917, 1, 3. 
- 4 ~1bid., August 30, 1917, 13. 
47!!?!!!•, September l, 1917, 5. 
48seott , Negro !!. £1!.!. World !!!I.~ 72. 
prejudice and discrimination that produced the conflict49 and urged the 
Government to stand firm on the policy of sending colored draftees to 
50 
the South. 
On September 8, 1917, the War Department after consideration an-
55 
nounced the decision to continue the assignment of Regroes to all canton-
ments both North and South. They would be segregated in compliance with 
state laws. 51 Three days later, Secretary of War Baker clarified the 
Department's position. 
The rule of the regular Army in the matter of training of 
colored troops, which is that they be trained in separate 
organizations, will be adhered to. The call for colored 
men will be postponed until one of the later calls so they 
will be called at a separate time, giving an opportuntty to 
the officers in the camps to assemble the organizations of 
which they are a part at once. They will not be the last 
called but they will be called separately. All colored men 
called in a state which has a cantonment in it will be organ-
ized and trained there. Provision will be made for the 
assembling of colored troops for training in states that 
have no cantonments at a later date. An opportunity will be 
given both the colored and white ' men among the selected force 
to volunteer for training in certain lines of communication, 
organization of which is of a non-cQmbatant nature J_j_/ 
opportunity will also be given to colored men to volunteer 
for comb.a.tant service . L;i£/52 
This stand by the War Department was praised by the Negroes anxious to 
have the chance to exhibit race loyalty, 53 but the extreme radicals viewed 
tpe order as an attempt to encourage non-combatant enlistments by the 
54 
Megro. 
49savannah Tribune, November 17, 1917; Chicago Defender 9 September 
l, 1917; Baltimore Afro-American, September l, 1917; (editorials). 
50savannah Tribune, September 8, 1917; Baltimore Afro-American, 
September 1, 1917; September 8, 1917; (editorials). 
51Baltimore ~ -American, September 8, 1917, l. 
52 Ibid., September 15, 1917, l . 
53chicago Defender, September 15, 1917, editorial. 
54Baltimore Afro-American, September 15, 1917, editorial. 
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Several northern Negro units were sent South to train over southern 
protests and threatened riots. 55 But when the first camp allotme~ts for 
colored draftees were made on September 22, 1917, the War Department vio-
lated the custom of assigning the men to the camp nearest the place of 
induction, curtailed the quotas for certain southern camps and doubled 
up in other sections.56 Southern opposition continued as late as 
Bovember, 1917. Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi in a letter 
to President Wilson on November 13, 1917, suggested that training camps 
for Negro troops be established in Cuba.57 
The dispute over training alarmed -those Negroes eager to reap the 
rewards of service and delayed the actual participation of .the colored 
race in the war. In addition, the -controversy probably accounted for the 
extension of training, from September 15 to October 14, for the prospective 
colored officers at Des Moines.58 
Nevertheless, the colored leaders who supported the militant patri-
otic position by October 15, 1917, could point with satisfaction to the 
83,000 black citizens called in the first draft, the 639 captains and 
lieutenants collllllissioned at Des Moines, the appointment of a Negro advisor 
to the War Department and the official authorization of the Ninety-second 
Division that was to be exclusively Negro except for the ~taff officers.59 
55Chicago Defender, October 20, 1917, l; Scott, Negro in the World 
War, 77-80. 
56scott, Negro .!J!. !!l!, World~, 72-73; Baltimore Afro-American, 
September 29, 1917, l. 
57osbbrn, John Sharp Williams, 295. 
58 
Baltimore Afro-American, September 22, 1917, land editorial. 
59 Scott, Negro .!J!. Sh!, World~. 90-91; Savannah Tribune, October 
20, 1917, l; November 3, 1917, l; November 17, 1917, l; Baltimore Afro-
American, October 13, 1917, l. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The radical leaders in 1912 believed they had managed to associate 
their cause with the reform program of the incoming Wilson administration. 
However, the belief was shortlived due to the influence of the southern 
racist sentiment within the Democratic party and Wilson's concern with 
problems he felt were more im~ortant than race relations. It seems that 
the vague general statements issued by Wilson in the campaign of 1912 
did not justify either the enthusiasm exhibited by some of the radical 
leaders nor the later denunciations of the President. 
Despite the disappointment with Wilson the radical movement continued 
to attract support. The conflicts with Wilson publicized their views and 
attracted sympathizers from all races. None of the prominent radical 
leaders had a direct connection with Wilson. Oswald Villard served as 
liaison man between the Negroes and Wilson. This made it easier for them 
to repudiate the President and resume their independent poli;ical position. 
The war conditions provided, at an opportune moment, an even greater 
idealism than the New Freadom to which the radicals might attach their 
cause. The hope was partly nullified by the delay and conflict arising 
out of the incorporation of the Negroes into the military effort. One 
possible contribution of the war was the decline in racist legislJtive 
proposals in Congress. Only seven such measures were introduced from 
April 4, 1917 to November, 1918. 1 The fact that the Democratic majorities 
1congressional Record, LV> pt. 1, 299, pt. 7, 6930, 6989; LVI, pt. 
1, 46, pt. 6, 5325, 
57 
58 
were reduced considerably in the 1916 elections might have dampened the 
hopes of the southern racists. Ironically the great boon to the radicals 
as a result of the war was an enlarged economic base for the race. The 
labor demand and the resulting Negro migrations north provided the po-
tential for .effective independent political action. 
The radicals were disappointed because ~they failea to receive recog-
nition in the Negro war participation. The Tuskegee group was given the 
recognition and the responsibility through the appointment of Emmett Scott 
as special assis t ant to the Secretary of War . However, the radicals were 
left free to agitate and to act as critics, thus benefiting from any dis-
content . 
It seems that the radicals might have benefited indirectly from the 
reform and idealistic atmosphere between 1912 and 1917 since the N.A.A.C.P., 
the largest independent organization, increased in membership during the 
period from 320 to 9 , 282. 2 However, their great desire to identify their 
asp_irations with the idealism and reform spirit was never realized. The 
death of Washington , migrations north and the organizational efforts could 
have accounted for the growth of the N.A.A.C.P. 
2 
Wolgemuth , ' 'Wilson and Federal Segregation ," 172-173. 
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